12 June 2002 BERKELEY UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me begin by thanking the Goldman School of Public Policy, the Institute of European Studies, the World Affairs Council of Northern California and the Italian Department of the University of California, Berkeley, for this invitation.
This is my first visit to San Francisco, and I must confess to a certain emotion in being here.
I first heard talk of Berkeley when I was little more than a boy. Its name echoed through Europe, heralding what would shortly become the era’s great youthful revolt over there as well.
So for years I associated the name of your campus with those events and that period of my life.
Today I can finally have the pleasure of discovering Berkeley for myself. This is one of the many reasons why I am grateful for the opportunity to be here. I ask only for your patience with my imperfect pronunciation.
The fact that a prestigious university such as yours is cultivating a dialogue with representatives of the Left and of European reformism is very positive.
What is even more significant is that it is taking place during a sensitive phase of international life and on topics at the core of the political agenda in both Europe and the United States.
The relationship between “us” and “you,” Europeans and Americans, is one of deep historical affinities, and from the same liberal democratic matrix.
For millions of people, America is the country that restored freedom in Europe after fascism and nazism. But there is more. In you we see a part of our culture and our civilization. Just as a part of America lives inside all of us. Through movies, music, literature.
Ours is a complex relationship that is not always linear, harmonic.
We’ve been through difficult moments, and even had our falling-outs.
Yet always within a solid framework. Never forgetting that we belonged to the same culture.
This is another reason why the emotions that September 11th stirred in Europe were so widespread and profound.
The attack on the United States was also, in a way, an attack on Europe.
But its effect was immediate solidarity and admiration of America’s ability to respond.
A feeling confirmed by the country’s political response. Particularly the fact that the Bush administration—despite the reservations and concerns it generated—did not choose the path of a unilateral response.
Such an approach would have aggravated the crisis. Instead a different policy prevailed, more diverse and reasonable.
The idea of an international coalition against terrorism emerged immediately.
The United Nations was invited in, amid growing expectations. All the more significant in that it was unexpected.
A few days after the attack, the White House clearly manifested an openness toward the Arab world. Including President Bush’s statement on the recognition of a Palestinian State.
It was a strategic choice: the search for the broadest possible unity of forces, nations and cultures in the fight against a devastating new form of terror.
The attitude of Europe and Italy was consistent with this choice.
We never thought that the management of the crisis was your problem alone.
On the contrary.
When Operation Enduring Freedom was launched, on the basis of the proof collected, Italy also approved the decision, voting in favor of deploying Italian soldiers in support of the Operation.
We were willing to face down criticism and sharp opposition because we were convinced that the events justified the use of force, as did the need to free the Afghan people from a theocratic, repressive regime in collusion with international terrorism.
I must be equally sincere in admitting the doubts and concerns raised in the months to follow over the way that policy evolved.
Concerns that grew when an exclusively military solution seemed to prevail in the fight against terrorism.
In my opinion, this is the heart of the problem today.
Not only in terms of future events but also in terms of the strategic vision of this conflict. Here we are dealing with the great political question of our time and not with an “ideological and military war on evil.”
I can personally understand why Americans might see Europe as too reluctant to use force and too willing to seek political mediation, even in situations involving non-democratic regimes.
As if Europe were unable to take on its own responsibilities.
A “light power.” Capable of a remarkable economic, political and diplomatic performance. But ready to drag its feet—and make others drag theirs—when there is a need to use force.
What America’s conduct of the military operation in Afghanistan has revealed is this:
That America has the means and the might to handle even the most difficult crises by itself. But in a kind of isolation that, while it does testify to America’s “greatness,” also points to the danger of imprudent solitude.
Although it had invoked article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, at a certain point the United States gave the impression that it wanted to go it alone.
This decision was not without implications.
No one would deny that the American armed forces has greater resources, means and training than the European armies, which today are still more of an assembly of individual national armies.
But the heart of the problem is political and not just strategic. In the sense that full collaboration, including military collaboration, is a prerequisite to strengthening a political coalition.
I am not referring to whether or not specific circumstances require us to assume clear responsibilities, also of a military type.
But to “how” this should be done. In terms of legitimization by international organizations and in view of public opinion.
When I think back to my experience as the head of the Italian government, for example, I would say that we addressed the touchy crisis in Kosovo with determination but without losing sight of these issues.
We accepted the road of military intervention but without refusing to look for a political break-through, which was essential if we wanted to rebuild hopes for peaceful coexistence.
So we tried to understand the reasons driving the various parties. Including the Serbs, even though they had primary responsibility for the ethnic cleansing of entire territories.
It could be that in those days the American administration was chaffing at the added burden of having to conduct a military action with the full consensus of the Atlantic Council.
But that added burden—and this is my point—gave the United States an added guarantee. The guarantee that it wasn’t alone in managing such a complex situation.
So the Alliance does have a “weight.” A weight derived from shared responsibilities.
This is also the condition for greater political force. Shared responsibility is an added resource that the United States should never underestimate.
Events have proved us right.
Today Slobodan Milosevic is being tried for crimes against humanity at the International Tribunal in The Hague.
After free elections, Ibrahim Rugova is the new President of the autonomous region of Kosovo.
I recall these events because if we are to confront a terrorism that strikes in different forms and ways—and in different parts of the world—I am convinced that the same logic applies. An approach characterized by maximum determination in carrying out repressive actions together with a clear political strategy.
This is the only way to defeat the new terrorism. Above all, we have to grasp its origins, nature and might.
What is the new terrorism?
It’s not a question of distinguishing—as some people might—between “good” and “bad” terrorism.
Although we should remember that from 1972 onwards, the United Nations was unable to come up with a common definition of the term that could be inserted into a possible global convention against terrorism.
The trouble is that the discussion always tends to dredge up the ancient philosophical ambiguity between the means and ends of political action.
Which brings me to my point.
Is there in fact a dividing line between legitimate freedom fighters who might also avail themselves of violent actions against civilian targets and modern terrorists?
The only possible response is a firm condemnation of the means, regardless of the ends pursued.
The violent action is a terrorist act not because of its relation to a cause but because of the target it strikes.
To attack a military unit that is occupying a sovereign territory is for all purposes an action of war.
To strike a restaurant or a markets, killing defenseless civilians, is—regardless of the cause—a terrorist act.
Does this mean equating the suicide killers of the World Trade Center with the Palestinian teenagers who are blowing themselves up in crowds of Israeli citizens?
Personally I don’t think so, even though a terrorist act should still always be condemned.
Yet there are differences between the two episodes that we must consider if we are to develop an effective strategy against terrorism.
We must have the courage to honestly grasp the processes that trigger that violence, also so that we can curb its growth.
This means being equally firm on our condemnation of the forms of “state terrorism”—which unfortunately exist—and therefore of decisions to target and bomb defenseless civilians in a logic of violence and indiscriminate retaliation.
It also means clarifying the strategy of the fight against terrorism.
One can be fooled into thinking that the problem is limited to a few groups of fanatics. And that the solution is to annihilate their cells.
But this, in my opinion, would be an illusion.
The real question is how much consensus and support is generated around these forms of fanaticism.
If terrorism appears to be the only instrument available to peoples who are deprived of any other contractual force to affirm their rights, then it is clear that it will always find new fuel.
This is the greatest danger that we face.
It is no accident that one of Bin Laden’s objectives was to modify political balances within moderate Arab states.
This is precisely why the solution to the problem today must be political and not just military.
That September 11th somehow represents “the dark side of globalization” speaks to us of the need for a return to politics, after a decade of thinking—wrongly—that the new era would be dominated solely by the rules and interests of the economy.
So the problem is how to equip Europe and the United States for a battle that affects our future.
There are two ways to face this challenge.
One is to retreat. To withdraw inside our own borders as a form of desperate defense. One element of Europe—the more radical and xenophobic Right—would do just that. Europe as a fortress, folded in on its own identity.
Or there is another way.
Harder and more complicated. But the only way that can govern the conflicts and contradictions of a unified world.
It’s the logic of a global governance based on two great objectives.
The first is a security policy.
An effective conflict prevention strategy on a world-wide scale.
The second is a fight against social imbalances and against new conflicts between diverse identities and cultures.
In globalization civilizations that were long separate now have to coexist. The solution to the problem cannot be the homologation or annihilation of the seemingly weaker identities.
Some expressions of terrorism are a response to this danger, as is shown by forms of religious fanaticism inspired by a disastrous defense of one’s own civilization.
We must understand that in this dimension—of a world in which social imbalances and cultural distances tend to increase—a climate of hostility is growing that the West must do its best to prevent.
Drying up the wellsprings of hatred means offering some hope of redemption to millions of people. And at the same time without threatening their identity.
It’s true: globalization fuels fears, in a downward spiral destined to produce new violence as well as a new clash between civilizations.
And this must be stopped.
Through suitable policies at the level of economic assistance, in a new phase of world cooperation. But also by cultivating dialogue.
What we cannot accept is the idea that East-West bipolarity will be replaced by North-South bipolarity. A new militarization of international balances would inevitably impact our democracies internally, since it would close off spaces for freedom by replacing the old nuclear threat with a new frontier between terrorism and anti-terrorism.
The true challenge is to build an inclusive world order based on the rights of all.
This is where we must measure the maturity and depth of our new ruling class today.
We will never win the challenge of the new terrorism if we fight the battle in the name of the West and of our model of society.
We will only win if we fight for a “new world order” that is more fair and based on the values of liberty and democracy.
This is the basic distinction. If we do not understand it we will pay a dramatic price.
Starting with the expansion of Islamic and other forms of fundamentalism.
Let me underline that this fundamentalism is not a residue of some archaic tradition but rather the expression of modern anti-Western thinking, born as a reaction to the idea of a neo-colonialism being ushered in by globalization.
There are biographies—I’m thinking of the main theoretician of Sciite terrorism, who is a major scholar and an expert on Heidegger—that confirm this truth.
There are many reasons that show we are entering a testing ground.
A testing ground represented by the crisis in the Middle East and by the way out of it that the international community will soon be called upon to identify.
Why the Middle East?
What makes this issue so decisive?
In my opinion, there is one basic reason.
The possibility to prove that the international community does not practice a double standard in its judgments and assessments.
This is the basic problem
Not just the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict per se. But the need not to be handing extremism and Islamic fundamentalism another reason for propaganda and recruitment.
This means applying those principles that alone can guarantee a negotiated solution to a crisis, no matter how dramatic.
There are some elementary questions to which we must respond.
The first is whether or not United Nations’ resolutions apply always and to everyone.
Acts and consequences of vital importance to the future of politics worldwide pivot on our answer to this question.
Our answer—the answer of the European Left—is yes. The international community—if it wants to be able to intervene politically and, when necessary, militarily—must uphold international law.
Always and everywhere.
This is not just a formal question, a question of consistency.
It is, obviously, a political question of substance.
What does it mean, in the eyes of the Arab world and others, when the sanctions against Saddam Hussein are applied with the proper strictness but not the UN resolutions on Israel?
How can we not see the grave implications and dramatic consequences of this double standard?
It is at this level that the international community’s action is needed, also to defeat the political designs of extremist forces that are destroying the prospects for a Palestinian State to be born.
We need to have the courage to impose peace.
Also as an act of consistency: basically, now that we have rightly come to privilege the defense of human rights over the principle of national sovereignty, we are now required to identify the political means to push the Middle East crisis toward a fair solution.
But this is not just Europe’s responsibility.
The truth is that if we want peace, we must make demands of both one side and the other.
Of Israel and the Palestinians.
Only in this way can dialogue become a concrete possibility again. With the backing of a clear political will.
I personally continue to believe that the starting point for any peace prospect is the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Palestinian cities. A withdrawal that has been urged by the international community as a whole and also by President Bush.
For his part, Chairman Arafat must demonstrate a stronger commitment to the fight against terrorism than he has in the past.
On this basis two concrete objectives could be pursued.
On the one hand, the constitution of a single Palestinian military force in the territories, accompanied by the disbanding of militias that do belong to the Palestinian Authority.
On the other, a security collaboration agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian forces with the presence of international observers and, if necessary, a neutral military contingent.
But all this would not be enough.
What is also needed is mutual recognition by the parties to the conflict and the two States that will have to live side-by-side, a renunciation once and for all of the rhetoric of denying each other’s existence.
Only in this way can the negotiation on unsolved questions—first and foremost, the future of the settlements—continue unimpeded.
Finally, we need a Peace Conference involving the direct protagonists of the conflict, the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations.
A conference that, on the basis of UN resolutions, will establish the principles for a stable and peaceful settlement in the region.
This is the road that should be followed if we want to prevent the tragic Arab-Israeli conflict from being reinforced by dangerous anti-Western and anti-American sentiments and the consequences that they can bear.
I am nearing my conclusion.
But not before underlining how this analysis alludes to two great basic problems.
The first is the issue of European-Atlantic cooperation.
In fact, the challenges I have named undoubtedly demand greater responsibility and political authority from Europe.
The United States—this is still crucial—must not be “left alone”; for its part, it must understand that it cannot “go it alone.”
This would not be in its best interests.
The true challenge is to combine the positive aspects of the European diplomatic tradition with the virtuous elements of the tradition of America, which has never shirked the responsibilities, in moments of need, that derive from the use of force.
So in the age of globalization, we need you. But the converse is also true.
America needs a Europe that is politically strong, able to move as a global actor in the new scenario. A Europe finally endowed with a system of common security and defense.
On this basis it will also be easier to guarantee respect for today’s three basic principles of conflict management.
The first: greater prevention, as demonstrated by the tragedy of September 11th.
The second: the use of force should never be separated from political action dealing with the causes of the crisis.
On this subject, many remain unconvinced by the impression the American administration is giving us that it wishes to privilege a rigid model.
A division of roles that would assign to the United States the job of “hard security”—armed intervention in an emergency—and delegate to the Europeans the task of “picking up the pieces,” a kind of nation building after America has fulfilled its function in international politics.
I fear that in the long term a recipe of this type would inevitably lead to the break-up of the European-Atlantic relationship.
Because in a historic phase such as the present, the use of force and political objectives must always be conceived and implemented together.
The third principle—a result of the first two—regards a strengthened multilateralism centered on a reformed relationship between Europe and the United States.
I know I am raising an issue that is anathema to the American administration, which on various occasions has theorized a kind of “à la carte multilateralism.”
There have been clear signals of this approach.
The rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, on which both Europe and Japan invested considerable energy and resources. Or President Bush’s decision to cancel former President Clinton’s last decision on the International Criminal Court.
In reality—I am deeply convinced—a strengthened multilateralism is not just in the interests of countries like ours that you consider, in many respects, to be structurally weaker.
Strengthened multilateralism is also in the interests of the United States and its power.
The reasons are simple.
The more the world is perceived as a unipolar reality, the more the stronger and richer country will be viewed as an enemy to fight by those who see globalization as an inherent danger.
So it is not in America’s best interests to cultivate overexposure.
Instead we have a common interest to share the responsibilities and build a new system of relations on a global scale.
It is here that I would place—I really have concluded—the other great problem to address.
How to rethink and reorganize the great international organizations, since the European-Atlantic dimension by itself is unable, for obvious reasons, to achieve the legitimization in the eyes of the world that is needed today to found a new international order.
The idea of a global government without rules, where a single super power is licensed to act, at best with the support of European diplomacy, is dangerous and illusory.
It is also up to us—to the United States, first of all, and to Europe—to work on a reform of those institutions so as to favor clear elements of democratization of the new global phenomena.
Especially if we truly believe that the risks of globalization include an increase in inequality and a reduction of democratic spaces. This is precisely why we need strong international institutions together with a clear system of universally recognized and safeguarded principles and values.
Democracy, respect for human rights, freedom for each individual to realize his or her personality, and social solidarity could not survive if they were confined to a single part of the world assailed by desperation and fanaticism.
They can only win if they are progressively affirmed as the regulatory principles of a new universal human existence.
Thank you.
