13 June 2002 STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I was delighted to accept the invitation to be here today, owing not only to the prestige of this University but also to the fascinating topic we will be discussing.
Europe is living through a difficult and crucial moment in its history.
In the wake of the euro, we Europeans are now called on to decide the shape of our political union and our role in the global world after the demise of the old bipolar order.
As in every great moment of change, radical innovations exist alongside fears that guarantees and security will be lost.
This ambivalent feeling—the impulse to seek the new combined with anxiety over the consequences—is a crucial aspect of the end of a political cycle and of the current crisis in European socialism and reformism.
If we look at the experience of Guterrez in Portugal or Jospin in France, or even Wim Kock in Holland and the Olive Tree Coalition in Italy, it is hard to deny the serious troubles the European Left is experiencing staying on in government despite action that over the years has produced significant growth rates and prosperity.
Naturally the question is why this has happened.
Above all, why is it happening now, in the midst of a decisive transition for our common future.
There are many reasons, but they can perhaps be summarized in a few great basic questions.
The first is related to the modern concept of security.
The transition underway exposes weaknesses and tensions in Europe—and elsewhere—in areas of the economy and civil co-existence itself.
The result is a society that is increasingly susceptible to simplified messages regarding complex problems.
As the Director of the Institute for Higher Studies in Political Science in Paris, Guy Hermét, recently wrote, Europe today is facing a new type of populism that is manifested in three different forms.
There is a localist, separatist populism adverse to any supranational dimension.
A nationalist populism that interacts constantly with the more traditional Right.
Finally, there is a technocratic populism as gifted in its use of the media as it is unscrupulous.
Hermét goes on to say that Italy is a particularly interesting case since in our country the government alliance represents an original cocktail of these three tendencies.
What’s interesting is that all three are expressions of a political crisis that has materialized as a reaction to fear.
Fear of globalization, fear of losing something: a part of one’s well-being or acquired privileges.
So Europe has to come to terms with a new development: a society that is frightened and thus more fragile, less cohesive and more vulnerable.
This feeling is not just a consequence of the new global competition and the possible reduction of the old social services.
It is also the sign of a cultural loss, a loss of identity.
The point is that the new Right, despite the consensus it enjoys today, seems unable to meet the social and political demands on which its electoral fortunes depend.
We could say that neo-populism evokes fears and phantoms that it is then unable to govern.
This makes it even more imperative for the Left to deal with these concerns by indicating suitable strategies and solutions.
So the challenge before European reformism is how to address these new fears.
The response to the demand for security—in terms of individual existence, the right to work, and adequate services—can no longer be met by the old model of welfare.
To succeed in such an ambitious operation, what is needed first of all is a clear vision of the unsolved problems and the emerging trends.
A few weeks ago, after the unexpected success of Le Pen in the first round of the presidential elections, France responded with a landslide in favor of Chirac.
While this was definitely a positive sign, it was not a solution to the problem.
In the sense that what remains, and what weighs on the building of a future Europe, are the six million votes that went to a man who doesn’t hesitate to call the gas chambers “an accident of history.”
Just as the political fact remains that in the first round only one citizen in four voted for Chirac or Jospin, for one of the two dominant figures in recent French politics.
For a country like France, where participation in democracy is deeply rooted, this is a new development that indicates not just the extreme fragmentation of what the political system offers, but also the emergence of an anti-system movement with which we must come to terms.
Many indicators point to the trouble that traditional political cultures—both reformist and conservative—are having in representing the new needs of a broad swathe of the electorate.
As if Europe were paying the price for its success.
Essentially, after the fall of Communism, the century ended under the sign of German reunification. And with the definitive reaffirmation of the political and social compromise that social democracy had consolidated throughout the post-war period.
Yet despite this, today we are seeing the threat of public opinion becoming detached from our political and governmental system.
I mentioned the French vote.
But before Paris there was the signal that came from Austria with Haider. And from Belgium.
I repeat, while these episodes are distinct and they do not coincide, they allude to the same problem.
Namely, a defeat of socialist reformism that cannot be explained as a “normal” rotation with a conservative block.
It is a more troubling defeat.
Because it strengthens a Right wing that gives voice to nationalistic and localistic sentiments that, when they are not openly xenophobic and racist, are in open contrast with a model of civilization based historically on values of tolerance and respect.
The true challenge is to understand the origins of this rupture.
I have already alluded to some of them.
There is not doubt that globalization casts doubts on the European social model of the second half of the twentieth century.
In the last half century, Europe—this is the point—experimented with a democratic path to social inclusion.
It did so by combining democracy and political participation with economic development and the strong cohesiveness of our societies.
This model provided a response to old cultural, ethnic and religious contrasts.
Differences that at times led to crises and conflicts but always developed within a model whose substance held strong, at least until today.
What events can I summon to contradict this arrangement?
I think that at least two great processes should be indicated that are taking place right before our eyes, and in many ways, under our direct responsibility.
As I indicated at the outset, we are dealing with a process of European political expansion and integration, and, in a broader sense, with the globalization of the economy, culture and society.
I will explore some features of both, believing them to be two sides of the same coin.
In the sense that the ties and dependency between one and the other will be decisive in steering Europe toward a confirmation of its identity, or, failing that, toward a profound crisis.
The integration and expansion of Europe.
As Yves Mèny recently wrote on the subject of France’s electoral upheaval, “Whether Europe is actually at the origin of the new dividing lines, or serves instead as the scapegoat for the voters’ most disparate protests, the undeniable fact is that the European Union is at the center of the problem today.”
It’s true.
A significant share of our public opinion lives in apprehension over the contradictions of globalization.
The point is that the resources, powers and role of nation states do not appear sufficient to govern processes that by their very nature are more and more supranational.
In this framework, only Europe can shoulder the responsibility for choices that will affect the future of hundreds of millions of citizens.
But which Europe?
This is the decisive point.
There is no question but that the adoption of a single currency in twelve countries has been an extraordinary factor of political unity.
But this does not change the fact that in recent years, although the power of the European Commission presided over by Romano Prodi has grown, a basic uncertainty remains concerning the Commission’s democratic legitimacy and accountability.
In other words, we stand before the demand for a Europe that is politically strong, but this demand has not yet translated into an institutional arrangement that is suitable and has the courage to be innovative.
We could say that the crisis of the old national institutions has not yet been overcome by the birth of solid new European institutions.
By itself this aspect would still not justify the anti-system movements that have been manifested in various countries, including, most recently, Holland.
To understand this new development we need to consider a second element.
In recent years the process of European integration has had a strong impact on the policies of individual nations.
It has set rigid criteria for the management of public finances and prescribed binding rules in the area of budgetary policy as a confirmation of the “stability pact” that has reduced—and this is the key aspect—the differences between the alternating political alignments.
To some extent the new economic arrangement of Europe has limited the flexibility of national strategies and policies.
With the consequences that this loss of flexibility has produced. Also in the shape and the image of a reformism that has inevitably lost a clear sense of its own identity.
We could say that we have had confirmation that good economic performance by itself is not enough to maintain and extend an electoral consensus.
It’s not enough.
Because today our societies are feeling the brunt of other emergencies and of heavy new insecurities.
How can we address this situation?
What strategies and on the basis of which key ideas can European reformism overcome its current crisis?
A simple correction to the old reform model cannot suffice—and this I wish to underline.
The processes underway require the construction of a new political project for Europe.
My opinion is that the only credible response today is to build a Europe that is a strong political subject and a credible global actor.
Basically, for the entire post-war period, the greatest European statesmen—from Adenauer and Schmidt to Mitterand and Kohl—have grounded European unity in the economy.
A little out of fear that an eventual acceleration of the political process might prompt a resumption of nationalism. But also out of a healthy dose of realism.
My point being that only today can the political dimension articulate convincing responses to the problems consigned to us by globalization, ranging from the new insecurities and the citizenship issue to the building of a new social model.
This is why I am so interested in the proposal made last month by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to introduce elections for the President of the European Council to a five-year term. This would give Europe a political face.
This hypothesis would help solve the problem of the fragility of the Commission’s current Presidency-in-Office system.
Nevertheless it is equally clear that such a major investment in the people would require a comprehensive reform of our institutional architecture, since such a strong legitimization has to be met by a true checks and balance system.
Therefore we Europeans and the international community as a whole are facing a major new development.
On the other hand if we do not choose the road of a European solution to the problems raised the localistic response will be strengthened, since the Right wing will then be even more aggressive in playing the card of a political reflux back into the old nationalist dimension. Damaging not just Europe but the world balance as a whole.
The outcome of this clash will determine the social and civil model with which the other actors of globalization—starting with the United States—will have to contend.
The first step, as I have said, is to create a democratic and supranational political power.
The launch of the euro has been a success and a historical watershed. But it has also raised huge problems, starting with the most evident question of whether a central bank can exist without a corresponding political power.
Whether it is possible, in other words, to endow Europe with a single currency while postponing to a later date the strengthening of a common government, especially in the strategic spheres of foreign and security policy.
In essence, the birth of the euro was propelled by the idea of competing with the United States and its currency.
By the wish to regain greater autonomy and a different role in the world’s economic and financial realm.
This is a significant question also in terms of Europe’s potential for economic growth and development.
In fact it is hard to imagine a single currency and market without strong political autonomy that can harmonize fiscal and social policy and coordinate innovation and development strategies.
We could say that Europe cannot remain mid-stream for long, and that the problem arising is how to separate the Union’s competences from those of the single states.
Defense, foreign and fiscal policy, social policy and education: we need to rapidly expand the field of action where a politically integrated Europe can exercise its power.
This should be done with the greatest possible attention toward a balance between the powers of the Commission and those of the various national and regional institutions.
This is the sensitive issue of Europe as a federal subject—what Jacques Delors likes to call a “federation of nation states”—endowed with a constitution that can accompany the integration process without the need for constant updating and revision.
On the other hand, it is plain to see that if the chosen path will be to strengthen the federal element, the issue of democratically legitimizing decision-making becomes absolutely central.
The European Convention being chaired by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, whose task is to draft the new constitutional charter of the Union, will have to set down the precise criteria, offering greater certainty to the development of a political and sovereign Europe.
This first question also epitomizes the issue of future borders.
The elimination of internal borders within the Union and the creation, in their place, of a new external border.
This is a sensitive issue that brings into play Europe’s various cultural, national and linguistic identities.
Obviously this isn’t a matter of proceeding forcedly toward the homologation of existing differences.
The point is to guarantee each and every European youth the possibility of free movement, to study, work, and live in different countries while respecting their social standards and similar opportunities.
What comes into play here is the quality and depth of the new ruling class called upon to direct this process: starting with the ability that it will have to grasp the close connection between educational and social inclusion policies and new expectations of life and self-realization.
Even more significant will be the drawing of Europe’s future external borders once its expansion process has concluded.
The problem is how to support, also from a governmental and regulatory profile, a dimension that continues to expand.
In other words, what, concretely, is the Europe that we have been imagining and building?
The Convention will have to address this problem by defining the future borders as a condition for consolidating the political nature of a unification project that, for obvious reasons, must be based on net distinctions between an internal and an external space.
The choice to be made, ultimately, is between a Europe that is an “economic giant and political dwarf,” like Germany in the 1960s and ‘70s.
Or, on the other hand, a Europe that is a global “power” endowed with a system of common security, foreign policy, and defense and external intervention model.
It is clear that to a large extent future world balances will rest on this choice.
Yet this very awareness should stimulate European reformism to engage in a strategic study of its own future.
Reference to a foreign policy, to a common security and defense policy, leads to the final question: the political function of Europe within the new global balances. And in this regard, the characteristics of a new season in Euro-Atlantic relations.
In general terms—as I said a few days ago at Berkeley—I am convinced that a strong Europe is in the United States’ best strategic interests, since it reduces your overexposure on the world scene, alleviating a burden of responsibility that is excessive if born by one country alone, however large and powerful.
It is a question, therefore, of establishing a new type of relationship.
In the past decade the adhesive between Europe and the United States has changed radically. In the sense that the end came to the historic context—the cold war—that for so long justified a special bond between the two sides of the Atlantic.
We could say that our long post-war period is finally over and that we have experimented with new forms of collaboration, also in the management of delicate regional crises, such as in the Balkans and in Kossovo.
In recent years it has become more and more evident that to renew the bond between Europe and the United States, we needed to replace a “common threat”—Communism—with a “common vision,” namely, a common strategy to address the risks and opportunities of globalization.
September 11th was a tragic confirmation of this intuition.
The point is that the United States—like Europe—cannot tackle this new season by itself.
Within the new global scenario, America’s old unilateralism is not enough, however grounded it may be in resources and extraordinarily powerful means.
Just as it is not enough for Europe to invoke a superficial multilateralism, which has often led to political inertia in the face of crises that required urgent measures or intervention.
Something different is needed.
Something that former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt called “an axis of good.”
Not in the sense of a destructive clash of civilizations but, on the contrary, the capacity to give life to a new global order that is able to prevent and heal crises and foster the consolidation of supranational institutions endowed with definite powers and authority.
So what does reasoning of this nature entail for Europe?
First of all it means that Europe—to be a strong and significant partner to the United States—must define its vision of the world in positive terms, starting with itself and its own identity.
It’s true. It is very hard to clearly establish one’s own profile without pointing to an “enemy.”
Historically—and politically—we tend to distinguish ourselves more by criticizing someone else than by affirming ourselves.
The sensitive issue is to do things in such a way that Europe does not define itself by its differences with the United States, but rather that it chose to contend with its own internal enemies in a genuine and thorough manner.
The enemies cited most often: populism, localism, xenophobia. In short, the new fears of globalization.
The road we must take is thus to patiently and generously build an alternative to the dangers of political and moral involution.
This alternative is a strong, integrated and politically autonomous Europe.
A Europe with open borders, that does not fear the burden of its responsibilities, endowed with suitable institutions, that in its dealings with the United States lays claim to its own identity and a new global role.
Personally, I consider this to be the great test of reformist culture.
To fight the “animal spirits” of the Right, but on the basis of a social project and cognizant of a renewed function for Europe within the international balances that are being formed.
A Europe able to defeat its internal enemies and its recurrent phantoms.
Open to the challenges of globalization and innovation, without fear of losing a heritage of civilization, cohesive values and solidarity
Only in this way can we offer more convincing responses to demands that otherwise risk feeding the consensus of extremism in its various expressions, on the Right and on the Left.
Just to give you an example, I am thinking of the demographic challenge of the upcoming decades and of the fact that while our working age population will tend to decrease, yours will continue to increase.
From our perspective, only immigration can make up for this reduction. But this will require open markets, inclusive societies and a social model equipped to support the new developments.
Here—at this level—European reformism must indicate strategies, solutions and programs.
And it is on this basis that we must try to regain our lost consensus and win new ones.
Knowing that we will not just find the strength to continue in the noble reasons of the past.
We must address the present challenges and those still to come, also with the courage to change a part of our political culture, opening ourselves up to different sensibilities and experiences.
From this point of view I consider it fundamental to the European Left to resume dialogue with the liberal components of the United States. A dialogue which, by the way, was already initiated not long ago, during the Clinton administration, under the title “The Third Way.”
To rethink Europe—imagine its future, its institutions, policies, and the network of rights—is thus the challenge of the new reformism today.
The only certainty is that a new historic cycle has begun.
However things may go, in the next few years the face and nature of Europe and of each of the nations that constitute it will change.
The point—as always—will be to understand who will have the strength and the ideas to influence this process and in what direction they will chose to take it.
To us—in the best tradition of European reformism—falls the duty not to disappoint the expectations and the hopes of the many in a democratic, modern evolution toward an unprecedented transformation.
Thank you.
